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Introduction: Mobilizing Rights in Nepal
 Since the promulgation of the 1990 constitution, conflicts over the rights it enshrines 
have proliferated in Nepal. Throughout the same period, negotiations between social groups and 
political institutions have been increasingly phrased in the language of rights, echoing the 
growing importance of the “rights-based” approach in the international development circuit.1 
Although this is a general trend world-wide, what is peculiar to Nepal is that, besides articulating 
the dialectics of some of the major social conflicts unfolding in the country, the discourse on 
rights was also at the core of the drafting of the new constitution and one of the main tools of the 
“New Nepal” building process. In this article, I will underline three features of this discourse and 
its mobilization in Nepal.
 The first is its close connection with the sphere of law and, more generally, with legal 
discourse. Rights are indissolubly linked to the law and legal discourse is one of the frameworks 
within which the public debate unfolds in Nepal nowadays; as a result, the judiciary is playing an 
increasingly  important role in social struggles. The centrality of law in the new form of the 
Nepali state was already stated in the preamble to the 1990 constitution, which solemnly 
underlines the commitment to “transform the concept of the Rule of Law into a living reality,” a 
commitment reiterated by the interim constitution (2007) and confirmed by the newly-
promulgated constitution (2015).
 The second feature is the predominance of group rights over individual rights in the 
Nepali context; indeed, individual rights granted in the 1990 constitution had not proven very 
efficient in addressing the rights gap in Nepali society, and the debate over rights was dominated 
by the issue of group rights (Gellner 2001; Malagodi 2013), which became a central theme in the 
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1 In the 1990s a shift occurred in the global development paradigm, as the Cold War economic model was 
replaced by the post-Cold War rights-based model. The international development actors selected respect for human 
rights as a key indicator through which to evaluate development and reframed international relations accordingly 
(Cowan, Dembour, et al. 2001:12): “As the human rights regime becomes increasingly entrenched at a global level 
in international declarations, conventions and agreements which are negotiated, implemented and monitored by 
national, international, and transnational institutions, this understanding of rights as a structuring discourse seems 
increasingly persuasive. Many analysts already talk about human rights culture as a core aspect of a new global, 
transnational culture, a sui generis phenomenon of modernity.”
conflicts surrounding the drafting of the new constitution.2 The appropriation of the language of 
rights for collective action, by caste and ethnic groups and social movements alike, is also linked 
to the third feature: the growing presence in Nepalese public debate of allegedly non-political 
groups, such as civil society associations, organizations, federations, and the like, alongside 
political groups. These associations are admittedly  constituted in order to “raise the voice” of the 
people they represent and to advocate for their recognition and rights in the public arena.
 These “voices,” however, need to be legitimized in order to impose their presence in the 
social field, and to establish their claims and viewpoints on social realities. Such a legitimization 
is sought by activists through different strategies and at different levels: the social, political, and 
legal ones. I will here give an example of these dynamics in the legal arena by considering the 
use of a specific tool, Public Interest Litigation (PIL). This tool was conceived to facilitate access 
to justice on behalf of marginal and disadvantaged sectors of the population, who were prevented 
from resorting to the courts by  their weak social position and lack of education or by their lack of 
economic means.3  Through an analysis of one of these litigations, I suggest how local 
associations attempt to mobilize the power of the law to legitimize their own counter-discourse 
about rights, that  is, their own “discourse of truth,” according to Foucault’s terminology, about a 
specific social reality.
 The question of “truth” is constantly  highlighted by local associations, and can be 
considered a key term in their claims and self-representations (as well as one of the central issues 
in the debate on New Nepal). Beside the study of the structures underpinning discourses of 
“truth,” pertaining to the domain of epistemology, Foucault (2009) points out the interest of 
investigating forms and conditions through which the subject represents himself/herself and is 
recognized by others as saying the truth: following this approach, I will consider how the power 
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2 In 2006, a large-scale people’s movement, known as Jana Andolan II, restored multi-party democracy in 
Nepal after four years of direct rule by King Gyanendra. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that followed, 
signed between the major parties and the rebel Maoist Party (CPN-M), put an end the decade-long Maoist 
insurgency and led to the restoration of the parliament. The latter promulgated an interim constitution in 2007, 
abolished the monarchy and declared Nepal a federal republic; general elections were held in 2008, but the 
constitutional assembly thus formed failed to pass a new constitution—primarily because it could not resolve the 
issue of the federal structure—and was dissolved in 2012. Another constitutional assembly was elected in 2013 and 
produced a new constitution that came into effect in September 2015.
3 This procedure originally began in the United States and has by now become widespread almost 
everywhere in the world, but it has developed in a very specific way within the Indian context. The exceptional 
character of the Indian PIL lies in the relaxing of procedural requirements and locus standi, the rule imposing a 
direct relation between the litigant and the court,  according to which only the aggrieved party is allowed to demand 
legal remedy. As opposed to this rule, and in order to guarantee a legal representation to under- or non-represented 
groups or interests, Indian judges allow a third party (individuals or social actions groups not directly affected by the 
alleged violation) to take the matter to the Supreme Court, acting pro bono publico, that is,  on behalf of 
disadvantaged sectors of the population or public interest issues.
Moreover, the relaxing of procedural requirements enables the elimination of financial and bureaucratic 
obstacles linked to the filing of a writ petition, because, in this case, courts’ attention can be drawn even by writing a 
letter or sending a telegram. Thus, in order to permit fuller access to courts, Indian PIL has been marked by a 
departure from procedural rules. This explains why civil society associations and social activists that—by definition
—work on behalf of disadvantaged groups or public interest issues have, since its creation, utilized PIL as a 
privileged tool to achieve social justice. Nepal has not only fully adopted, from a juridical point of view, these 
developments of the Indian PIL, but has actually enshrined this procedure in specific provisions of its 1990 (art. 88), 
2007 (art. 107), and 2015 constitutions.
of law is enlisted in the construction of discourses that are given, and are received, as discourses 
of “truth.”
 This power of the law cannot be overemphasized: as Bourdieu (1987) has shown, the law 
shares with other authoritative discourses the mechanisms of symbolic efficacy, and its specific 
acts of codifying, naturalizing, and instituting, are socially  recognized as producing truth. This 
power of uttering the truth, of resolving conflicts and negotiations by publicly proclaiming the 
truth about them, is embodied in the judgement of a court (838):
 The judgment is the quintessential form of authorized, public, official speech which is 
spoken in the name of and to everyone. These performative utterances, decisions publicly 
formulated by authorized agents acting on behalf of the collectivity, are magical acts which 
succeed because they have the power to make themselves universally recognized. They thus 
succeed in creating a situation in which no one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, 
which they impose.
 The case study I will focus on here tells the story—and suggests the limits—of one of 
these “magical acts” in contemporary Nepal, through which the authority  of the legal speech has 
transformed certain socially invisible and unnameable people into an official community.
The Case: Context and Implications
 This recent PIL, registered as Sunil Babu Pant and Others v. Nepal Government and 
Others,4 is one of the most sensational legal cases ever discussed in Nepal and has had echoes all 
over the world. It was filed against the government by a group of local NGOs5 at the Supreme 
Court of Nepal in 2007. It concerns the rights of LGBTI, or Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
and Intersexual people;6  the consortium that filed the petition was headed by Blue Diamond 
Society (BDS), the most important Nepali association active in the field of LGBTI rights.
 BDS was founded in 2001 and, since its creation, has been very  active in advocating 
LGBTI rights. Initially  focused on the sector of HIV prevention, the organization has 
progressively  widened the scope of its activities to include human rights programs on behalf of 
LGBTIs, which culminated in the filing of this litigation.
 The main objective of the petitioners was to obtain legal recognition of LGBTI rights: to 
this end, while denouncing social discrimination, abuses, and ill-treatment against LGBTI people 
as well as the state’s inefficiency and reluctance to protect them, they  demanded the amendment 
of discriminatory laws, the promulgation of new ones to specifically uphold LGBTI rights and 
the formal decriminalization of homosexuality. It should be noted that homosexuality  was not at 
that time, in the National Code (Muluki Ain 1963), considered as a crime in itself, but belonged 
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4 Writ No. 917 of the year 2064 BS (2007 CE).
5 Mitini Nepal, Cruse AIDS Nepal, Parichaya Nepal, and Blue Diamond Society.
6 The terminology used in this case and in this context varies between LGBT and LGBTI.
to the larger category  of “unnatural intercourses,” arū aprākritik maithun (Chapter 16 on 
“Bestiality,” paśu karani-ko). In particular, this chapter specifies that sexual relations with 
animals, as well as other “unnatural intercourses,” shall not be practiced, and are punishable by a 
maximum penalty of up to three months imprisonment, or by a fine not exceeding 100 rupees 
(Fezas 1983:338).7
 Indeed, the opposition natural/unnatural is central to the procedure: in this regard, one 
may suggest that the symbolic task of this PIL was to transform individuals with “unnatural” 
orientations into “natural” persons, whose rights are protected by laws. As we shall see, however, 
the legal recognition of LGBTI rights also entailed—not unambiguously  in the specific context 
of Nepal, with its 102 officially  recognized minority and caste/ethnic groups—the recognition of 
LGBTI people as disadvantaged minorities because, in order to successfully enlist the power of 
the law by resorting to the PIL procedure, and thus to legitimize their claim to LGBTI rights 
(which is tantamount to validating their own discourse of “truth” about non-heteronormative 
sexualities), activists themselves need to be legitimized as representing a group.
 Because such a process of legitimization takes life through the legal discourse, the text of 
the litigation offers a good example of how the authority of the legal discourse can shape social 
realities in a context of conflicting public meanings. The present analysis will therefore focus 
mainly on the text of the judgement itself, with the aim of exploring some mechanisms through 
which legal discourse may transform dominant public meanings by legitimizing (or de-
legitimizing) public representations, that is, by establishing the “truth” about them.
 In particular, I will try to show how the power of the law (in what seems currently to be 
one of its most authoritative forms, the language of rights) has been enlisted by the activists and 
deployed by the Nepalese Supreme Court, through the three acts of codifying, naturalizing, and 
instituting highlighted by  Bourdieu, in order to introduce new gender and sexual categories into 
the public discourse, and thus to institutionalize a “new” minority based on these categories.
 I also wish to point out the central role of activists and associations (as well as the 
ambiguities tied to this role), within the transnational proliferation of gender/sexual categories,8 
in disseminating the “language of rights.” I would finally like to suggest  that the modalities of 
such a creation of a gender/sexual minority may, in the specific context of Nepal, jar with local 
experiences of non-heteronormative sexualities. Such a dissonance, however, must be set against 
the undeniable importance and success of this PIL, which has transformed LGBTI people from 
individuals with “unnatural” orientations, into “natural” persons whose rights are protected by 
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7 There is no evidence of the use of this statute in Nepali legal records after the promulgation of the new 
Muluki Ain, in 1963, when the chapter on sodomy of the old Muluki Ain was suppressed and “crimes against 
nature” were incorporated in chapter 16 (see infra) (Fezas 1983:338).
8 On the increasingly global phenomenon of the proliferation of gender/sexual categories and identities,  as 
well as their “officialization” in public discourses, see, for instance, Altman (1996 and 1997); Jackson (2000); 
Broqua and Eboko (2009).
laws, and whose newly-acquired visibility  comes out in such events as the gay pride parades held 
in Kathmandu and other cities, which would have been unimaginable only a few years ago.9
The Articulation of the Litigation: Positions and Discourses of the Petitioners, the 
Respondents and the Court
 Let us now take into consideration the text of the litigation, starting with the incipit of the 
activists’ petition, in which they present their discourse on non-heteronormative sexualities and 
lay  the foundations of the “new” sexual/gender minorities, through a collective coming out (NJA 
2008:262):10
 We, the petitioners, are involved with organizations which represent a minority of people 
in terms of sexual orientation and gender identity. We have been denied by the .  .  . society, law and 
state mechanisms a proper position in the community. [We are] Expressing our dissenting view 
with the prevalent social structure and norms as well as with the legal provisions adopted by the 
state, based on the interest of the majority people, i.e. heterosexual male and female persons. 
Because of such practices and provisions, we have many instances of being ourselves subjected to 
physical and mental torture. We, the four petitioners, representing at least 60 thousand people, are 
demanding an appropriate place in the society and the recognition of our rights.
 Such a statement ran directly counter to the socio-cultural denial of non-heteronormative 
sexualities at the time of the litigation: in 2004, for instance, as opposed to the figure of 60,000 
LGBTI people claimed by the petitioners,11  a senior officer of the Kathmandu police declared 
that “homosexuals are maximum 150 in our country, and we know what to do with them” (BDS 
2005:3).
 Looking now at the position of the respondents,12  we may  note that they enact the 
opposite strategy. Firstly, we do not find in it the polemical opposition to the activists’ claims 
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9 Although gay pride parades started a little before this strategic litigation, at that time they were not 
presented as such by the activists organizing them: held during the Gaijatra (the “Cow Festival,” held in memory of 
the recently deceased), they were justified as funeral processions commemorating the HIV/AIDS victims. This is 
one of the elements suggesting the strong connection between recognition of the LGBTI minority and HIV-related 
activities, as highlighted below (see Conclusion).  However, besides its association with death, there is also another 
aspect of the Gaijatra that should be underscored, in order to appreciate its recent appropriation by the LGTBI 
community, that is, its carnival-like subversion of the social order. The festival is traditionally filled with jokes, 
songs, satire against authority, mockery, and humor, and people often cross-dress.
10 Page numbers refer to the English version of the original Nepali text, published in 2008 in the National 
Judicial Academy Law Journal (NJALJ). However, for the purposes of this paper, I have utilized the text translated 
by BDS, and have re-translated from the Nepali version the points whose content was unclear. This explains the 
minor differences (mainly corrections of grammar and spelling mistakes) as well as some more important textual 
variations between the NJALJ version and the one quoted here.
11 300,000 is a more recent figure claimed by BDS (see Conclusion).
12 The respondents in the case were the following: 1. Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers; 
2. Legislature-Parliament; 3. Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs.
which characterizes other, earlier PILs in Nepal: in this case, the respondents limit themselves to 
denying the alleged infringement of rights denounced by the petitioners, claiming that the state 
has imposed no obstacles upon them and that they are “independent and able to enjoy all the 
constitutional and legal rights to be obtained in the capacity  of a person” (NJA 2008:265). They 
further assert that “. . . in case the petitioners were treated in a discriminatory manner . . . and . . . 
[in case of any] violence against them, there seems to be no restrictions depriving them from 
having remedy, specifying their sexual identity distinct from a male or a female” (NJA 
2008:264). They also emphasize that “only concerned individuals can enter into the court for the 
enforcement of such legal rights, with evidence in case of infringement” (ibid.).
 In other words, the respondents’ position consists in denying that the issue is a collective 
one and in presenting it as a purely individual matter. By stating that “only concerned individuals 
can enter into the court for the enforcement of such legal rights,” they deny  the locus standi13 of 
the petitioners, because this kind of representative locus standi can be used only by individuals 
or associations advocating for public interest or representing a group (a procedure authorized by 
article 107(2) of the Interim Constitution). This strategy indirectly underlines the preeminence of 
group rights over individual rights in the Nepali context: what is at stake for the respondents is 
not the recognition of the individual rights of LGBTIs, which seem to remain a rather abstract 
(and irrelevant) category for them, but the potential recognition of the rights of LGBTIs as a 
group, and therefore the validity of their recourse to PIL.
 Let us now come to the discourse of the Court which, it should be noted, parallels that of 
the activists. For this reason, I will consider here the activists’ and the judges’14 discourse jointly 
because, unlike what occurs in other PIL cases, they  happen to coincide in this litigation, having 
the same structure and a very  similar content; one might even interpret the judges’ discourse as 
an expansion, a strengthening, of the activists’ discourse.
 The judicial discourse starts by summarizing the themes of the litigation and the 
respective positions of the litigants. Judicial reframing of narratives is a constant characteristic of 
litigations and has a specific function: to produce juridical facts. Indeed, “[s]ince juridical facts 
are the products of juridical construction, and not vice versa, a complete retranslation of all of the 
aspects of the controversy is necessary, in order, as the Romans said, to ponere causam (to “put” 
the case), that is to institute the controversy as a lawsuit, as a juridical problem that can become 
the object of juridically regulated debate” (Bourdieu 1987:831-2).
 In order to state their case, the judges formulate the main questions structuring the 
litigation in the following way (NJA 2008:266):
1) Whether the writ petition concerning the rights of homosexuals and the people of third gender, 
considered as a minority (on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation), falls under the 
category of public interest litigation (PIL) or not?
2) What is the basis of identification of homosexual or third gender people?
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13 See note 3.
14 The Supreme Court Division Bench for this litigation was composed by Justice Balram K. C.  and Justice 
Pawan Kumar Ojha.
3) Whether it happens because of the mental perversion of an individual or such a characteristic 
appears naturally?
4) Whether the state has made discriminatory treatment with the citizens whose sexual 
orientation is homosexual and gender identity is third gender, or not? and
5) Whether the order as sought by the petitioners is worth issuing or not?
 Let us now consider how the above-mentioned questions concur in articulating the 
operations of codifying, naturalizing, and instituting, through which the court enacts its 
authoritative speech about non-heteronormative sexualities.
Codification: The Power of Naming
 This operation starts by  taking into consideration the first question of the ponere causam 
(“Whether the writ petition concerning the rights of homosexuals and the people of third gender, 
considered as a minority, on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation, falls under the 
category of PIL or not”). In answering this question, which justifies the overall procedure, the 
Court firmly asserts that  the petitioners do have locus standi, therefore affirming that they 
represent a group and thus implicitly nullifying the defense strategy of the government (NJA 
2008:266, 268):
 It is a constitutional duty and responsibility of the state to make the deprived and socially 
backward classes and communities able to utilize the opportunity [of using PIL] and to enjoy the 
rights equally as other people do, according to the principles of distributive justice and social 
justice. In our judicial practice, the issue of social justice is being recognized as an issue of public 
interest or the issue of public interest litigation (PIL).  Definitely, because of many reasons 
including social, economic, cultural, etc. as well as the inaction of the state, the question of the 
protection of the rights of disadvantaged people or groups falls under the category of PIL.
 . . .
 The third genders shall still be considered as a disadvantaged class of citizens, because of 
social perception and social behavior towards them, as well as lack of education, knowledge and 
economic backwardness within the society of third gender [people].
 Once they have established that the “third genders” are a disadvantaged class of people 
and are thus entitled to resort to PIL, that is, once they have officially  acknowledged their 
existence as a “backward and disadvantaged” community, the judges move to the second 
question structuring the ponere causam (“What is the basis of identification of homosexual or 
third gender people?”), in order to properly define the difference between sex and gender, as well 
as the various categories of LGBTI people. The latter should be codified and defined in order to 
be explained and, eventually, “legitimized.” To this end the Court engages in a process of 
categorization of non-heteronormative sexualities, by  deploying an impressive taxonomic effort, 
focusing firstly on the LGBTI minority  as a whole and then on the various categories composing 
it.
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 These categories, whose utilization is so recent in Nepal, are conceived and defined by 
the judges through an almost literal Nepali translation of the corresponding English terms:15 
mailasamalingi, (“female homosexual”), purushasamalingi (“male homosexual”), duilingi 
(“bisexual”), tesro lingi (“third sex”), antarlingi (“intersex,” or people affected by Disorders of 
Sex Development, a condition where the appearance of external genitalia is atypical in respect to 
the gonads or chromosomes). In this sense, judges are here not only writing a historical page of 
the Nepalese jurisprudence, but also inaugurating a new page in the Nepalese vocabulary.
 By deploying this effort, through the codification of the categories composing the sexual/
gender minorities, the judges enlist the inherent performative power of the legal discourse, 
namely its specific linguistic efficacy: the power of naming, a power that “creates the things 
named, and creates social groups in particular. It confers upon the reality which arises from its 
classificatory operations the maximum permanence that any social entity has the power to confer 
upon another, the permanence which we attribute to objects” (Bourdieu 1987:838). This public 
utterance, that makes things real simply by saying them, and which makes it therefore possible to 
speak about, think about, and admit a conduct that had previously been tabooed, is one of the 
specifically symbolic effects of the law (Bourdieu 1987).
 If the power of naming, however, makes possible the materialization of a certain reality, 
the actual form which the latter will acquire depends upon the “names” that are chosen, that is, 
the sources upon which the classificatory operation lies. In this regard, it is worth noticing that 
the judges perform a long review of the international literature concerning the subject, an 
operation of definition and codification carried out with great accuracy and detail. Indeed, the 
bibliographical sources the Court draws on are very  eclectic, ranging from UN reports and 
Covenants to the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, as well as Wikipedia entries, but 
they  mostly consist  in UN treaties or international human rights publications, which will 
eventually—as we shall see—constitute the basis of the “discourse of truth” on non-
heteronormative sexualities as ratified by the Court. Among these sources, the Yogyakarta 
Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (2007), elaborated by an international group of human rights 
experts, is particularly  relevant. These principles, which affirm binding legal standards with 
which all states must comply, have become an important tool for judges, lawyers, and activists 
all over the world. Their use here is revealing as it suggests the complete alignment of the 
368 BARBARA BERARDI TADIÉ
15 Nepali definitions are not utilized; if such an omission is perfectly understandable in the case of the 
Nepali terms that have derogatory connotations (for example, chakka,  a very derogatory term for effeminate males, 
or hijra, transvestites or transexuals, and so on), the exclusion of terms employed by LGBTI people to represent 
themselves or their partners is more problematic. A UNDP/WI survey (2014) of these terms reported the local use of 
at least 21, non mutually exclusive, different definitions.  As far as transexual/transgender people are concerned, one 
of the most common local terms is meti: “In Nepal, some LGBTI members speak of being a meti—a semi-urban, 
even modern term appropriated from Darjeeling, that does not take its ideas about transgenderism from the 
globalized models of sexual identities. Metis are usually transvestites, who were born male but who do not identify 
as men. They seek the company of men, whom they call ta or panthi or ‘real men,’ who desire sex with metis but 
who elude the homo-hetero binary altogether. The phrase ‘dui atma bhayeko,’  or ‘two-spirited,’ is also in use in 
Nepal, a concept that not only implies an almost mystical consciousness but also draws on local imageries of 
androgyny” (KC 2008). This omission of local self-representations seems to be indicative of an (at least partial) non-
coincidence between global and local representations of non-heteronormative sexualities (see Conclusion).
Nepalese judiciary (and civil society associations) with the positions of the UN16  and other 
transnational institutions, as opposed to more conservative attitudes characterizing some of their 
judgements of the 1990s.17 It also suggests the way in which such evolutions in Nepal are linked 
to a transnational network of activists, which includes national and international associations as 
well as individual activists and pro-active judges. This associational network, of which the 
Principles are one of the products, can thus be considered as the site where the discourses of 
“truth” of world-wide activists meet and coalesce. In this regard, it is perhaps worth mentioning 
that one of the signatories of the Yogyakarta Principles is Sunil Babu Pant, the former executive 
director of BDS and himself the petitioner of this litigation.
Naturalization: The Legal Construction of Normality
 After this taxonomic operation of codification, the court undertakes a “normalization” of 
non-heteronormative sexualities. This, the second act manifesting the symbolic efficacy of its 
authoritative discourse about gender/sexual minorities, is, from a “technical” point of view, 
related to the third question of the ponere causam (“Whether it happens because of the mental 
perversion of an individual or such a characteristic appears naturally?”).
 This legal normalization18 can take place because the law has the power of imposing (and 
thus disseminating) the conception of normality it has endorsed, a conception that results from 
the application of specific juridical standards. In this sense the case illustrates the authority and 
the strategies of the judiciary in defining (or re-defining) what is normal and what is moral.19
 But let us see in more detail how this authority  is enacted in our litigation, starting with 
the juridical standards applied by  the Nepalese judges. As it emerges from the text of the PIL, the 
legal construction of normality  is centered here on the demonstration of the non-pathological and 
non-immoral dimension of sexual/gender non-conformity.
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16 The UN position itself was until recently not lacking in ambiguity: if the UN system de-pathologized 
homosexuality back in the 1980s, it is only very recently (June 2011) that the UN’s Human Rights Council passed its 
historic resolution condemning violence and discrimination against gays, lesbians, and transgender people.
17 Although such an alignment was theoretically established by the Nepal Treaty Act 2047 (1991), 
decreeing that internationals treaties ratified by the country are tantamount to national laws, in several early PIL 
cases related to gender justice filed during the 1990s the Court did not automatically apply international treaties; see, 
for instance, the famous PIL known as “Daughter’s Property Rights” (PIL of Meera Dhungana on behalf of FWLD 
v. HMG, Ministry of Law and Justice, Writ No. 3392, 2052, Decision No. 6013 of 2059, Timalsena 2003:164-74), 
where the Court did not draw on the tenets of the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, ratified by Nepal) to define women’s right to equality, evoking the risk of social 
disruption inherent in suddenly upsetting “traditional norms and values.”
18 The normalizing role of the law has been repeatedly underlined. See, for instance,  Bourdieu (1986); 
Lochak (1993); Dupret (2001).
19 Indeed, morality and normality are linked in an ambiguous relation, as normality, that is, what refers to 
“nature” and common sense, enjoys a status that is considered as legitimate in itself and—for this very reason—
morally desirable. Law proceeds from this double dimension of legitimacy and morality and at the same time creates 
it (Dupret 2001).
 Such a demonstration, which is organized around several oppositions (natural/unnatural, 
science/superstition, customary  perceptions-assumptions/international legal standards), is based, 
again, on the review of a large amount of documents, that constitute the juridical standards of the 
litigation. These standards pertain to two main categories: medical, psychiatric, and 
neuropsychiatric documents, as well as international legal treaties and judicial decisions, 
abundantly quoted throughout the litigation. This double benchmarking has a precise function in 
the economy of the judicial construction of “truth”: to confer to the latter both the scientific 
authority of positive science and the normative authority of ethics.
 Indeed, as again Bourdieu suggests (1987:818), the enactment of this double authority is 
a central feature of the power of law, through which the latter can appear as “a system of norms 
and practices founded a priori in the equity  of its principles, in the coherence of its formulations, 
and in the rigor of its application, . . . and thus capable of compelling universal acceptance 
through a necessity which is simultaneously  logical and ethical.” So, relying upon this double 
authority, the Court can now produce a series of statements through which it articulates its 
discourse of truth about non-heteronormative sexualities. This concerns, first of all, their non-
pathological dimension (NJA 2008:274, 281, and 280):
 Scientific evidences are backing up to establish that [homosexuality/transsexuality] is a 
natural process in the course of physical and emotional development of a person rather than a 
mental perversion or a psychological disorder.
 . . .
 The medical science has already proved that [homosexuality/transsexuality] is a natural 
problem rather than a psychiatric one. We cannot ignore facts that are proved by the medical 
science. Any provision that hurts the reputation and self-dignity as well as the liberty of an 
individual is not acceptable from the human rights point of view. The fundamental rights of an 
individual should not be shrunk on any grounds like religion, culture, customs, values etc.
 . . .
 There are also opinions in the society stating that sexual activities among the 
homosexuals and transsexuals are not natural; they do not have reproductive capacity; it is a social 
pollution; therefore,  such unnatural relations . . . shall not be legalized. Such opinions are based on 
the traditional approach of gender identity that recognizes only male and female.
 We can note here an opposition between medical science and human rights, on the one 
hand, and religion, culture, customs, and so forth, on the other hand. This opposition also 
characterizes the discussion about the ethical and moral dimension of non-heteronormative 
sexualities, which is based on encyclopedic references and a detailed analysis of recent 
international legal treaties and foreign judicial decisions (for example, by the Australian court, 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the Supreme 
Court of United States of America, and the Constitutional Court of Ecuador) that have 
decriminalized homosexuality (NJA 2008:274, 278):
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 After considering the above-mentioned various international legal contexts, it seems that 
the traditional norms and values in regards to the sex, sexuality, sexual orientation, and gender 
identity are changing gradually.
 It is an uncontroversial fact that only two sexes—male and female—are being recognized 
on the basis of sex in our traditional society. . . . Homosexuals and third gender people are also 
human beings like other men and women and they are also the citizens of this country as well . . . 
The state should recognize the existence of all natural persons including the people of third gender 
other than men and women and it cannot deprive the people of third gender of enjoying the 
fundamental rights provided by part 3 of the Constitution.
 It is important to underline that what has disappeared from this case (and more generally 
from the series of PILs that began in the 2000s) is the reference to the values of Nepalese 
tradition and religion, which were sometimes evoked in the first  generation of PILs (1990-2000), 
according to the survey I have conducted. In the present approach we no longer find the call to 
protect the traditional social system or the religious order, as was the case in certain less recent 
PILs on gender issues: on the contrary, when evoked, “customs” and “traditions” have, as is the 
case here, negative connotations, as they are considered as obstacles in the path of truth, and 
more specifically  the “international truth,” as the normative power of morality  now seems to be 
firmly grounded in the international human rights standards. The following statement of the 
Court is a clear example of this position (NJA 2008:280-81):
 We . .  . should gradually internalize the international practices regarding the enjoyment of 
the rights of an individual and practices of respecting the rights of minorities in the changing 
context of global society. Otherwise, our commitment towards human rights will be questioned 
internationally, if we ignore the rights of such people only on the ground that it might be a social 
pollution.
 Thus, this legal construction of normality involves, interestingly, a deconstruction of 
traditional morality, as enshrined in orthodox Hindu values. It should be noted that the latter 
values constituted the basis of the first legal code of the country—the Muluki Ain (MA) of 1854
—which can be considered, according to Höfer (2004 [1979]), as a “codification of traditional 
social conditions,” as well as a means to officially impose these “social conditions” (that is, the 
caste system, religion, and values of the Hindu Parbatya rulers) on the overall population of 
Nepal.20 In this sense, the old MA was not only  the epitome of orthodox Hindu values, but also 
the instrument ensuring the perpetuation of a Hindu caste society by  means of the most stringent 
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20 “The MA’s idea of social order consisted of a single social universe recognized in terms of its people of 
various varnas, the four traditional social classes of Hindu societies, and jātis, a term that refers both to castes and 
ethnic groups in the MA, residing in its territory. People of all castes as well as multiple ethnic,  cultural and 
linguistic groups were all made inclusive parts of it, and ranked in a hierarchy of the high to the low. The basis for 
the gradation of high and low was embedded in the Hindu ideology of ‘pure-impure,’ a ritual notion” (Sharma 2004 
[1979]:xxii).
laws possible (Höfer 2004 [1979]; Sharma 2004 [1979]).21 It is therefore not surprising, when 
one knows the importance of the control of sexual intercourse for the preservation of ritual purity 
and social hierarchy in Hindu caste society, to find that “more than one third of the MA deals 
with sexual relations, both inter-caste and intra-caste. The scrupulous accuracy  of the legislator 
amply confirms the importance these relations have for the maintenance of the hierarchy” (Höfer 
2004 [1979]:35). This is particularly evident  in the chapter “On Sodomy” (gār mārā-ko)22 of the 
old Muluki Ain, which was suppressed in the 1963 edition.23 This chapter, analyzed by Fezas 
(1983), considered sodomy from the point of view of the caste system, and was divided into two 
parts. The first specified the different  penal and socio-religious sanctions (penalties)24 according 
to the respective castes of the active and passive sodomites, while the second dealt with the 
degree of contamination that sexual intercourse or commensality with the culprit entailed on his 
wife and children, as well as with the consequences of such a contamination on their social and 
familiar status (Fezas 1983:309). Sanctions varied according to the hierarchic gap between 
partners: intercourse obeying the hierarchical order was punished by a moderate fine; intercourse 
contrary to the hierarchical order25  was more severely punished and could entail enslavement, 
caste degradation, and branding,26 the more so if commensality was also involved.27
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21 “The old MA [was] the epitome of orthodox Hindu values, and given to protecting the pre-1951 political 
order of Nepal as well as the social and religious values it had stood for” (Sharma 2004 [1979]:xv).
22 Literally: “On he who hits the anus.” For a detailed philological analysis, see Fezas (1983).
23 Following the legal abrogation of the caste system (Civil Liberties Act 1955),  the 1963 reform of the 
Muluki Ain led to the suppression of all the passages of the Code regarding caste relations, thus reducing the latter to 
one fifth of its original length (Fezas 1983).
24 As Gaborieau (1977) points out, there was a complementarity in the Nepalese system between the king, 
supreme judge who decides in the last resort, and the Dharmādhikār, the brahman expert in law. This 
complementarity emerged also at the level of sanctions,  which were of two sorts: punishments (danda) imposed by 
the king, and penances (prāyaścita), executed under the direction of the Dharmādhikār.
25 And especially those infringing the “purity border” between groups whose water can be accepted (pāni 
calanyā jāt) and those whose water cannot be accepted (pāni nacalanyā jāt).
26 Branding was evidently directed at avoiding water commensality (and the resulting necessary expiations) 
between the degraded member and those of superior castes (Fezas 1983:317-18).
27 As specified in § 10 of this chapter (Fezas 1983:313):
“If [a man belonging to] a high caste sodomizes [a man belonging to] a caste whose water cannot be 
accepted [but] which does not need purification after contact (whose contact doesn’t require purification aftermath):
- if he has not taken rice and water from the hand of the person [he has sodomized], a fine of 100 rupees 
shall be imposed on him, [and] after having had him accomplished a pilgrimage to Kāsi [or] Muktināth,  he shall 
be granted an expiation (prāyaścit(t)a);
- if after having sodomized [him] he has consumed rice and water from the hands of the [passive 
sodomite], he will not obtain expiation (prāyaścit(t)a). He must be, after having had him marked with the letter 
[indicating] the caste of the person whose rice [and] water he has taken after having sodomized him, assimilated 
to [a member of] the caste of the latter and free him; the passive sodomite shall be punished with a fine of 50 
rupees.”
As this extract of the chapter “On Sodomy” shows, in case of intercourse contrary to the hierarchical order, 
sanctions were more severe for the active sodomite than the passive one, thus suggesting the idea that sodomitic 
relations were considered as aggressions of the passive sodomite, which were to be punished the more severely as 
the hierarchical gap was greater between the two parties.
 Proceeding from the same logic of preserving caste hierarchy, the second section of the 
chapter on sodomy  specified that the status of the culprit’s wife did not  incur any detriment if her 
husband had been sodomized by somebody  whose caste status was equal or superior to his own, 
but was degraded if her husband had been sodomized by an inferior or had sodomized a man 
whose contact necessitated purification. In short, degradation of caste status did not  proceed 
from the act of sodomy itself but rather from the contact, which entailed a voluntary impurity 
(Fezas 1983:330-31). In this sense sodomy, as well as the other kinds of “unnatural sexual 
intercourse”—incest, adultery, rape, perversion—mentioned in the Code, constituted a threat to 
the social order and hierarchy. Such illicit or unnatural practices imply varying degrees of fault, 
generating an impurity  that can be transferred to other people and entail a degradation in caste 
status both for the persons immediately involved and—eventually—for their offspring and their 
fellow caste members (Höfer 2004 [1979]:35). This explains why these infractions must be dealt 
with by the legislators.28
 Such is the conceptual basis of the old Muluki Ain, which partially survives in the present 
version, despite the many amendments and radical revisions it has undergone. It is precisely  in 
order to eliminate these “lingering vestiges” (Sharma 2004 [1979]:xxvii) of Hindu legacies of the 
old Muluki Ain, still reflected in the new code of 1963 (especially concerning gender issues), 
that activists have, since 1990, regularly  utilized PIL as a tool through which the government can 
be made to amend discriminatory laws. More broadly, activists have used these legal struggles as 
an arena where the dominant traditional morality  concerning gender roles can be officially 
contested.
 The intention of the judiciary (and the activists), in this case, was to effect a revolutionary 
legal, and eventually social, transition from a notion of “natural” sexual relations established by 
traditional morality (that is, those permitted in the context  of legitimate marital relations and 
ensuring social reproduction and the protection of social hierarchy) to one defined by 
international legal standards (that is, based on the concepts of citizens’ rights, human rights, 
individual sexual orientation, personal choice, privacy) (NJA 2008:275):
 There is a legal provision for the criminalization of same sex marriage in the name of 
unnatural coition in our country. However, the sexual preferences and choices of every individual 
cannot be defined unnatural coition.  Hence, it is the appropriate time to think to decriminalize and 
destigmatize the same sex marriage by amending the definition of unnatural coition.
 In short, through this litigation, the underlying morality  defining natural sexual relations 
officially  shifts from a relational logic of group alliances, social reproduction, and the 
preservation of social hierarchy, according to which any form of extra-marital intercourse 
(homosexual or heterosexual alike) is, in fact, “unnatural,” to a logic relying on the legal 
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28 This also explains the high degree of social exclusion faced by “third gender” people, who are often 
evicted by their families or otherwise excluded from the common activities marking integration in the social group, 
especially ritual activities and commensality. As a “third gender” member of BDS comments (BDS 2005:106): “My 
family members are traditional and they could not believe in the law of nature. Therefore, my parents do not even 
drink water from my hands; they do not allow me to participate in social functions.  We sexual and gender minorities 
are facing this bitter situation everyday.”
concepts of person, privacy, and rights. The revolutionary operation attempted by the judges was 
therefore to make a transition from a notion of “normal and licit” sexuality  conceived as a 
collective matter (because its consequences bear on the group) to one conceived as a private, 
individual matter, whose consequences bear only on the individual (NJA 2008:280):
 The right to privacy is a fundamental right of an individual. The issue of sexual activity 
falls under the definition of privacy. No one shall have the right to question how do two adults 
perform the sexual intercourse and whether this intercourse is natural or unnatural. If the right of 
privacy is ensured to the sexual intercourse between two heterosexual individuals, such a right 
should equally be ensured to the people of third gender having different gender identity and sexual 
orientation as well.  Therefore there should not prevail such a situation where the gender identity 
and sexual orientation of the third gender and homosexuals would be overlooked by treating the 
sexual intercourse as unnatural.  When an individual identifies her/his gender identity according to 
the self feelings, other individuals, society, state or law are not the appropriate ones to decide as to 
what type of genitals s/he has, what kind of sexual partner s/he needs to choose and with whom s/
he should have the marital relationship; rather it is a matter falling under the sole right of self-
determination of an individual.
 It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this opposition reflects a more general 
dichotomy in the approach to sexuality and gender non-conformity, opposing customary norms, 
typical of traditional societies, to formal legal systems protecting individual rights, typical of the 
rule of law. On the contrary, the legal criminalization of sodomy was introduced in many 
countries only during the colonial period, and exactly coincided with the diffusion of the rule of 
law, as was the case in India for instance, where the British rulers introduced section 377 of the 
Indian Penal Code criminalizing “unnatural relations” in 1861,29  an article that was only very 
recently (2009) abrogated.30
 In this sense, the real opposition dominating this litigation is not one between customary 
norms and the rule of law, but one between the “morality of tradition” and the “morality of 
human rights.” Indeed, the idea of an emancipation based on gender identity is deeply entrenched 
in the language of rights, which emerges in this litigation as the authoritative discourse about 
non-heteronormative sexualities.
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29 Sodomy, in the few classic normative texts (śāstra) overtly mentioning it, was considered a minor 
offense: according to Manusmṛti, for instance, sodomy was a moderately severe religious fault, atoned for by 
penance; the Arthaśāstra and the Yājñavalkyasmṛti punished it with moderate sanctions (fines), probably imposed 
only on the active sodomite (Fezas 1983:317-22). Although the Kāmasūtra alludes only briefly to it, it is interesting 
to note that in the 1935 Bombay edition the editor specifies that sodomy was a “perversion against nature” and that 
the “present government” (the British) was adopting increasingly harsh sanctions to eliminate this practice (323).
30 It should be noted that the amendment to the Indian Code—again obtained through a PIL filed in 2009 by 
Naz Foundation (a prominent Indian NGOs advocating for LGBTs’ rights) in the Delhi High Court—was passed 
shortly after this landmark decision of the Nepalese Supreme Court, and that its passing was probably made easier 
by the international approval the latter had received.
Institutionalization: Ratifying the Rights of LGBTI People
 The final act needed for the institutionalization of the tesro lingi as a juridical entity and 
the ratification of LGBTIs’ rights, is articulated through the last two questions formulated by the 
Court in its ponere causam (“Whether the state has made discriminatory  treatment with the 
citizens whose sexual orientation is homosexual and gender identity is third gender or not?” and 
“Whether the order as sought by the petitioners is worth issuing or not?”).
 In order to deal with the first point, the Court, quoting and reformulating the discourse of 
the petitioners, lists a series of abuses LGBTI citizens have been subjected to, along with the 
concomitant rights that these abuses have infringed (NJA 2008:275):
 The petitioners have alleged that the state has made discriminatory treatment of citizens 
whose sexual orientation is homosexual and gender identity is trans-gender. The contentions of the 
petitioners also seem that the people of this community are being victimized by the family, [and 
by] domestic,  social as well as state violence; they are deprived of the social, economic, cultural, 
political, and civil rights as well; they have been humiliated in the society and family; they have 
been deprived of the enjoyment of services and benefits provided by the state; and they have also 
been deprived of the basic rights such as employment, marriage, and citizenship, etc.
 In this way, the Court—following the activists’ approach—reformulates in the language 
of rights some of the social and legal consequences of the traditional attitude toward the “third 
gender.” In particular, it should perhaps be specified that the “deprivation of basic rights” (such 
as citizenship) here mentioned, is one of the legal consequences of social discrimination in 
Nepal: we have seen that, traditionally, the “non natural” condition of gender non-conformity  is a 
source of pollution and shame for the whole social group and that, for this reason, non-
conforming individuals are often forced to leave their families. From a legal point of view, such 
an eviction implies not only that they will be divested of their right  to ancestral property and 
inheritance, but also that they will be prevented from obtaining citizenship or other legal 
certificates, as the latter can only  be issued if they are acknowledged by their relatives (through 
the Relationship Verification Certificate, Nata Pramanit).31
 Thus, in order to institutionalize the new minority, such a legal and administrative 
“invisibility” needs to be officially acknowledged, and structurally—as well as symbolically—
reversed, which is exactly what the judges attempt to do in this PIL. The need for such a reversal 
explains, for instance, the emphasis on introducing the mention of a “third gender” category into 
official documents, census forms, and so on (NJA 2008:281):
 The legal provisions like the chapters “On Bestiality,” “On Marriage,” “On Husband and 
Wife” of the Country Code (Muluki Ain), 2020 (1963 AD) as well as other provisions 
incorporated in other statutory laws in regards to the citizenship, passport, voter list, security 
check, etc. and our legal practices have not only refused to provide an identity to the people of 
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31 More generally, the legal exclusion of “third gender” individuals is ubiquitously present in the Muluki 
Ain, which maintains a deeply “gendered” structure, as most of its rules are strictly defined along gender lines and 
according to gender traditional roles (that is, “son” or “daughter,” “husband” or “wife”).
third gender but also declined to accept their existence as well. It seems apparent,  analyzing the 
situation, that the people of third gender are not living their lives easily according to their behavior 
and character because of the attitude of the administrative body and social context as well.
 But the Court here goes beyond the simple recognition of legal discrimination: it  also 
denounces the abuses and ill-treatment perpetrated against sexual minorities, highlighting the 
causal link between suffering and deprivation of rights. This is a recurrent feature of the 
language of rights, where suffering and social exclusion are recodified in terms of “human rights 
violations.” Not surprisingly, such a parallelism between rights infringement and the 
denunciation of suffering is also typical of this type of litigation (PIL), which can in fact be 
considered as a consequence of the language of rights. We can appreciate the power of this legal 
acknowledgement through the tremendous impact that this litigation has had on the press and in 
other public arenas, where the discussion of these previously tabooed subjects suddenly  became 
legitimate.32
 This systematic connection between suffering and infringement of rights has another 
important consequence: the framing of social problems as injustices, a device that lies at the very 
basis of the language of rights. One of the consequences of this device is the professionalization 
of social problems because, once they are framed as injustices, they become the prerogative of a 
group of professionals upon whom lies the responsibility for their redressing in court. It is 
therefore not  surprising that, apart from the judiciary, the great protagonists of the PILs that have 
marked the “era of rights” in Nepal have been Nepalese human rights associations, largely 
composed of lawyers. And even when they are not mainly composed of lawyers, as is the case of 
BDS, the work of these associations in developing, structuring, and disseminating the human 
rights discourse cannot be underestimated. It is enough to mention, as far as this litigation is 
concerned, how this discourse has been progressively  articulated within BDS, together with its 
main strategy: the parallel systematic denunciation of rights violations and of the suffering that 
these violations entailed, which has effectively  undermined the taboos surrounding the 
verbalization of these “unspeakable” matters. In this respect, the endorsement and ratification by 
the Court of such a discourse on suffering and rights violations is a very important achievement 
for the activists, and can be read as the official dismissal of a culture of silence, as well as a proof 
of the authority of the language of rights.
 It should be noted however that, despite the many references made by the Court to the 
interim constitution, the source of this authority ultimately emanates from the international 
normative framework. This explains why, in order to be authoritative, the Court’s denunciation 
of human rights violations needs to be buttressed by  the international discourse on rights: the 
judges, after mentioning the articles of the interim constitution guaranteeing the protection of 
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32 See Khanna (2009) for India.
fundamental rights, extend the discussion to the international legal framework on human rights 
violations, quoting extensive passages on discrimination and ill-treatment of sexual minorities.33
 This reference to the international context, while allowing the Court to affirm that 
“incidents of ill-treatment against the third gender and homosexuals are taking place not only in 
Nepal but also at the . . . international level as well,” also legitimizes the pertinence of the 
application of the international legal framework to the Nepali context. The Court can thus 
explicitly enlist the authority  of the “universal norms of human rights” contained in the 
international treaties and conventions ratified by the Nepalese government,34  which are 
tantamount to national laws (NJA 2008:276):
 Nepal has shown its commitment towards the universal norms of the human rights by 
ratifying the significant international conventions adopted for the protection of human rights.  . . . 
Being a party to these international treaties and conventions, the responsibility to implement the 
obligations created by instruments to which state is a party rests on the Government of Nepal 
according to the Vienna Convention on International Treaties, 1969 and the Nepal Treaty Act, 
2047 (1991 AD[CE]).
 The recourse to the superior and exogenous authority of the international treaties is, 
again, a constant feature of PILs in Nepal, together with the role that the international evaluation 
missions concerning human rights protection, an integral part of certain treaties ratified by the 
government of Nepal (like the CEDAW for instance), have played in supporting the “discourse 
of truth” of the activists and in reinforcing the latter’s power of negotiation vis-à-vis the 
government and the Court itself.
 To return to the judges’ discourse: after the official denunciation of discrimination, which 
represents the last passage needed to legitimize the activists’ “discourse of truth” on gender and 
sexual non-conformity, comes the verdict itself, which summarizes the previous steps of 
codification and naturalization, and culminates in the endorsement of the petitioners’ demands. 
Technically  speaking, the verdict constitutes the answer to the last question of the ponere causam 
(“Whether the order as sought by the petitioners is worth issuing or not”), and is articulated 
according to the major demands of the petitioners, namely (NJA 2008:281):
1) the amendment of existing laws to ensure that the third gender people (under which female 
third gender,  male third gender and intersexual are grouped) shall not be discriminated on the 
basis of sexuality, as well as the promulgation of new legal provisions to provide such people 
with a gender identity as per the concerned person’s self feelings;
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33 For example, in the following instance: “members of sexual minorities are disproportionately subjected 
to torture and other forms of ill treatment because they fail to conform to socially constructed gender expectation. 
Indeed, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity may often contribute to the process of the 
dehumanization of the victim,  which is often a necessary condition for torture and ill treatment to take place” (from 
the Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations).
34 Nepal has already ratified the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 1965, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, the International Covenant on 
Economic,  Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, the Convention on Elimination on all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), 1979, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.
2) the protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTIs by making appropriate legal provisions 
enabling them to live their lives with freedom as other heterosexual people and by 
recognizing them legally and socially as minorities (on the basis of their sexual orientation) 
being entitled to constitutional protection from the state and society.
 As this second demand shows, the petitioners base their request for protection of LGBTI 
people’s fundamental rights not only on “appropriate legal provisions,” but also on their 
recognition as minorities “entitled to constitutional protection.” The Court endorses this vision, 
where LGBTI people are not only  considered as individuals deprived of their rights but also 
emerge positively as a group  with its own identity, whose position is similar to that of the other 
castes, religious and ethnic groups that make up Nepal’s society (NJA 2008:278):
 According to the data published by the Center Bureau of Statistics/Government of Nepal 
in 2005, there are different religious groups in Nepal such as Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Kirat, 
Jain, Christian, Sikh, Bahai and others. The state cannot discriminate these religious groups. 
According to the data of the Government of Nepal, there are 102 identified ethnic groups and 
castes in Nepal. As the state cannot discriminate on the ground of religion, race and caste, 
similarly it cannot discriminate on the basis of sex also. Not to be discriminated on the basis of sex 
is a fundamental right of every citizen.
 This excerpt inverts the historical evolution of the language of rights, where group rights 
are conceptually  derived from individual rights: here, on the contrary, it seems that the Court 
needs to previously refer to the rights of the ethnic/caste/religious minorities as guaranteed by the 
constitution in order to then derive from them the individual, fundamental rights of “every 
citizen.” This reveals that, once more, the only  way to accommodate these individual rights 
within the Nepalese society is to ascribe them to collective entities, that is, minorities. To this 
end, the Court, ratifying the approach of the activists, turns gender non-conformity into the 
defining element of a minority whose rights can be claimed and negotiated.
 In keeping with this approach, the Court, in its verdict, then issues an order to amend 
discriminating existing laws, and to promulgate new ones in order to “ensure an appropriate 
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environment” for LGBTI people to enjoy  their rights.35 The Court also stresses the need to avoid 
further discrimination in the future legislation/constitution, in a judicial comment addressed to 
the constituent  assembly (NJA 2008:285): “it looks necessary to keep a clear provision in the 
new constitution guaranteeing that no discrimination will be perpetrated on the ground of gender 
identity  and sexual orientation, alike to the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa.” 
Finally, it concludes the verdict by  mentioning the question of same-sex marriage, by instructing 
the government to form a committee in order to study “legal provisions and practices of other 
countries regarding the gay  and lesbian marriage” and “international instruments relating to the 
human rights, the values recently developed in the world in this regard, the experience of the 
countries where same sex marriage has been recognized and its impact on the society” (286).
 The word “rights” rings through the verdict like a mantra: the centrality  of the language 
of rights could not be clearer. In fact, one could hardly  find one single sentence of the verdict 
without the word “rights” in it. The language of rights emerges from the litigation as the most 
powerful language, and indeed, its authority  cannot be denied: through its power, those who were 
only “invisible people” are now an official minority.
Conclusions
 This PIL displays in condensed form the stages through which the activists’ discourse on 
sexual orientation and gender non-conformity  has become a discourse of truth. It shows how the 
judicial operations of codification, normalization, and institutionalization have been instrumental 
in this process. It also shows how the overlapping authorities of the scientific medical discourse, 
of the international juridical framework, and of the language of rights concur in structuring and 
empowering the activists’ claims and the parallel discourse of the judges.
 I would like to suggest, however, that they also concur, in a more problematic way, in 
defining the morphology  of the “new” LGBTI minority and its official representations. In 
particular, as far as the scientific medical discourse is concerned, it should be noted that its link 
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35 “There should not be discriminatory constitutional and legal provisions that restrict the people having 
third gender identity from enjoying their fundamental rights. The LGBTI people generally have normal 
characteristics. They should not be deprived from the enjoyment of their fundamental rights only because of their 
sexuality, which means they are not attracted by the people of opposite sex as heterosexual persons and because of 
their cross dress. The state should make necessary arrangement for the people of third gender. . . . If there are legal 
provisions that restrict the people of third gender in enjoying the fundamental rights and other human rights 
provided by Part 3 of the Constitution and international conventions relating to the human rights, which Nepal has 
already ratified and applied as national laws,  with their own identity, such provisions shall be considered as 
arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory.  Similarly, the law enforcement function of the state shall also be 
considered as arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory” (NJA 2008:282).
“All fundamental rights provided in Part 3 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007 AD[CE]) from 
Article 12 to 32 have been guaranteed to every Nepali citizens and persons. The enjoyment of these rights with their 
own identity is a fundamental right of the petitioners as well though they are a minority. . . . The people with third 
type of gender identity other than male and female and different sexual orientation are also Nepali citizens and 
natural persons as well, so they should be allowed to enjoy the rights with their own identity as provided by the 
national laws, constitution and international human rights instruments. The state has the responsibility to ensure an 
appropriate environment and legal provisions for the enjoyment of such rights. It does not mean that only men and 
women can enjoy such rights and other people cannot enjoy them only because of their different gender identity and 
sexual orientation” (NJA 2008:283-84).
with LGBTI people is double: on the one hand, as the litigation shows, activists and judges alike 
use it to establish the “truth” about non-heteronormative sexualities, that is, its natural and non-
pathological dimension. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge the specific role that 
international aid programs on HIV prevention have played in the “coming out” of the LGBTI 
minority. It is not a coincidence if the only way to register BDS, in 2001, was to declare it as an 
association involved in HIV prevention, as the relevant governmental department (the Welfare 
Council) had refused to register the association under its real raison d’être, the advocacy of 
LGBTI rights (BDS’s staff, personal communication, 2011). At that  time, the only  way of openly 
speaking about homosexuality  in Nepal was through the medical discourse on the spread of the 
virus. However, if these programs were the starting point  of sexual/gender non-conformity 
verbalization and recognition in Nepal (for example, through the identification of “groups at 
risk”), they  eventually also imposed their specific terminology (like MSM, that is, “men who 
have sex with men”) and their essentialist stance on local self-representations. The very idea of a 
gay or MSM “community” was initially introduced in South Asia by international agencies and 
organizations, in line with their programs’ implementation strategies and exigencies, as 
Shivananda Khan36 aptly remarks (2010:160):
 A range of international and national agencies working in the field of HIV have 
recognized that, for effective and sustainable strategies to prevent the spread of HIV and to control 
emergent epidemics in a range of localities, countries and regions, MSM should be seen as a 
vulnerable “group” or “population,” and their sexual health concerns need to be addressed in ways 
that enable “community-based” responses.
 Through this logic, MSM has often been taken to mean a specific and exclusive sexual 
identity  in opposition to heterosexuality, where MSM  form an exclusive and bounded group/
community: “Too often programmatic decisions are taken within this limited view of what is 
essentially a behavioural term, while agencies and individuals speak of an ‘MSM’ 
community” (157).
 Thus, the recognition of the LGBTI people has been tied to their integration into the 
development industry  of Nepal and to their formatting according to the essentialist template 
imposed by this industry, which has conditioned the overall struggle of the activists. From the 
HIV prevention programs to the more recent rights programs, the terminology, sectors of 
intervention, and representations have depended on donors’ priorities, approaches, and 
categorizations, in a process that does not necessarily  reflect local perceptions and self-
representations. As Boyce and Pant note in relation to the category of MSM, in what was perhaps 
the first ethnographic enquiry on this issue in Nepal (Boyce and Pant 2001:9):
 Preliminary indications are that a considerable number of men who have sex with men in 
Kathmandu are married and/or have female sexual partners other than their wives, including in 
some instances women who sell sex. .  . . Indeed it is misleading to conceptualize men who have 
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36 Khan is an Indian activist and the founder of the Naz Foundation, a prominent activists’  organization 
advocating for LGBTI rights in India.
sex with men as a distinct and contained target population. Male-to-male sex does not exist in 
isolation. Rather sex between men takes place within socio-sexual networks and sexual activity 
patterns that are intimately integrated into the sexual lives of the so-called “general population,” of 
which men who have sex with men are themselves a part. This is particularly so in a country such 
as Nepal where sexual culture is such that there is no firm or predictable division between men 
who have sex with men and men who have sex with women.
 Overall, research in Nepal and India (Boyce and Pant 2001; Tamang 2003; Khan 2010; 
Khanna 2009; Coyle and Boyce 2015) has largely  confirmed this divergence between Western 
categorizations and South-Asian same-sex subjectivities and sexual practices, highlighting how 
the latter may not be conceived as an explicit aspect of identity but as an implicit aspect of 
intimacy, “querying but not necessarily overtly  countering apparently  hetero-modes of kinship 
and community” (Coyle and Boyce 2015:9).
 The institutionalization of the LGBTI minorities in Nepal entails therefore an ambiguous 
process, as the local, multiform, indeterminate (and individual!) ways in which sexuality  can be 
experienced and represented are being compressed into the dominant European-North American 
framework of understanding sexuality, historically constructed through the bio-medical 
register,37 the binary opposition between homosexuality and heterosexuality, and the language of 
identity  rights, which are at the basis of the process of legitimization of non-heteronormative 
sexualities in Nepal (Cowan, Dembour, et al. 2001:11):
 To the extent that claimants are compelled to use a certain language of rights in pursuit of 
what they need or want, and to portray themselves as certain kinds of persons,  when these may be 
alien to their self-understandings, it is evident that rights discourses are not ethically unambiguous 
or neutral. While emanating an emancipatory aura, their consequences both for those who use 
them and for those asked to recognize them are more contradictory. . .  . This is the paradox of the 
language of rights, the ways in which rights discourses can be both enabling and constraining.
 Though such a strategy can be politically  efficient, its symbolic, psychological, and social 
implications remain problematic, as, in order to obtain the legal recognition of a minority whose 
rights can be asserted, it  ties sexual and gender non-conformity to the bio-medical premise 
according to which desire determines identity.38
 Certainly, this process has enabled the activists’ discourse to acquire authority, 
reinforcing their claims for their rights. In this respect, it seems, the transformation of LGBTI 
individuals into “sexual and gender minorities” was unavoidable, not only as it  reflects the 
general position of the LGBT global movement, but also because it was consonant with the logic 
of the identity politics that  is now dominant in Nepal, where group rights have more weight than 
individual rights. It is interesting in this connection to note that, somewhat ironically, the 
activists’ essentialist strategy to assert their existence as a minority stresses and validates the 
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37 Foucault (1976). See Khanna (2007) for an analysis of the construction of sexuality through public health 
interventions in the Indian context.
38 On this point, see also Khanna (2009).
same principles on which the conception of ethnic groups and castes are based in Nepal. As 
Gellner (2001:190) writes: “What all Nepali political parties, pressure groups and revolutionaries 
seem to agree on is an essentialist view of the . . . divisions they argue over. All seem to agree 
that everyone in the country: (1) belongs to one and only one ethnic or caste group; (2) is born in 
that group; (3) cannot change their group.” These features also affect the activists’ and the 
judges’ conception of the new gender/sexual minority, by linking it  to “birth” or “nature” and 
making it a feature that is essential in the definition of the individual’s identity.39
 In this context, the institutionalization of new minorities based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity  marks a major departure from local practices of non-heteronormative sexuality,40 
which are “not always reducible to culturally explicit and socially evident claims to identities, or 
fixed across entire lifespans” (Coyle and Boyce 2015:9-10). While bolstering rights, such a 
process may turn fluid local practices into markers of globalized identities.
Epilogue
 The authoritative dimension of the discourse mobilized by the activists and the judiciary 
through this PIL can be measured through the multiple impacts that this litigation has had. There 
is, firstly, a social and psychological impact: whoever discriminates against or abuses LGBTI 
people is now liable to legal prosecution; more and more people are starting to overtly oppose 
the culture of silence and shame surrounding their sexual orientation, calling for their rights and 
denouncing cases of abuse (with the support of the BDS legal team), as is shown by the 
tremendous growth of BDS, which—under the name of Federation of Sexual and Gender 
Minorities41—boasts up to 40 local branches and at least 120,000 members. Nowadays, around 
300,000 community members are regularly  in touch with the Blue Diamond Society and its 
partner organizations, accessing services and sharing information, according to the last figures 
provided by BDS (BDS staff, personal communication, 2011).
 Secondly, there is a political impact. A few months after this litigation (April, 2008), 
Sunil Babu Pant, founder and former executive director of BDS, who submitted the petition to 
the Supreme Court, was elected to the first constituent assembly, where he advocated for gender/
sexual minorities’ rights to be included in the new constitution. The election of the first openly 
gay lawmaker (with more that 15,000 votes), as well as the inclusion of LGBTI people’s rights in 
the agendas of the main political parties, demonstrate how sexuality has become a political 
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39 See also Boyce and Coyle (2013) on this point.
40 The increasing influence of Western categories is suggested for instance by the difference between the 
Boyce and Pant enquiry on same-sex terminology in 2001,  when only a few people identified with the acronym 
LGBTI, and the more recent UNDP/WI survey (2014), when ninety-two percent of the sample chose one of the 
following seven terms as defining their primary identity: third gender, meti,  gay, lesbian, bisexual, heterosexual, or 
MSM. See also Tamang (2003), who notes the progressive adoption of the term “drag” by metis, compared to the 
older generation’s use of “going as a girl.” This author also notes the “shame” of certain metis in BDS to admit that 
they had intercourse with women.
41 This name echoes the “Federation of Indigenous Nationalities” (NEFIN) formed by the ethnic groups of 
Nepal, another sign of the way in which LGBTI people have adopted the dominant identity politics of the country.
object in Nepal. In the same year, the Nepal government (Minister of Finance) allocated a 3 
million NPR budget to the “community”42 (marking the first governmental recognition of LGBTI 
minority). The report  of the commission in charge of the issue of same-sex marriage, as per the 
Supreme Court directive, was issued in 2015 (February). The report recommended legalization 
of same-sex marriage and elimination of discriminatory provisions from the civil and criminal 
codes.43
 Thirdly, there is a normative impact, resulting in the inclusion of the third gender 
category in official documents and procedures: in 2010, the Nepal Election Commission 
permitted citizens to register as “third gender” in their electoral certificate, “without requiring the 
registered gender to match any other documents but basing the registration process entirely  on 
self-identification as per the court’s order” (Bochenek and Knight 2012:32). In 2011, the third 
gender category was also included in the basic data form of the 2011 National Census.44 In 2012 
the Government of Nepal officially instructed district offices to issue citizenship  documents 
listing male, female, and other genders: LGBTI people can now obtain official documents 
(passports and ID documents), with the mention “others” in the sex line, if they so choose;45  a 
choice backed up  by the 2015 order of the Supreme Court to the Government to issue passports 
for three genders (Knight 2015).
 But the most far-reaching impact, which can be directly related to the 2007 judgement, is 
the inclusion of the rights of sexual and gender minorities in the new constitution of Nepal 
(issued in September 2015), a historical achievement both for the LGBTI activists and for the 
judges who (first) legitimized their rights, converting their voice into a “discourse of truth” now 
enshrined in the country’s constitution.
 However, the transformation of these rights into a “living reality,” to quote the preamble 
of the 1990 constitution, will now depend on the capacity  of “New Nepal” to tackle present 
 ENGENDERING MINORITIES IN NEPAL 383
42 As related on the BDS web site http://www.bds.org.np/23-2/.
43 TKP 07-08-2015.
44 The census, however, failed to provide figures on “third gender” (see Knight 2011): although this failure 
was blamed on administrative and logistical problems, two others factors may be suggested. The first is a 
terminological one, as many LGBTI people do not define themselves as “third gender” (UNDP/WI 2014). This 
definition is interpreted in diverse ways, either including all sexual/gender minorities or merely transgender,  but is 
usually refused by non-transgender people. The other factor is the unwillingness of many individuals to identify as 
“others,” because if this volonté de savoir finds its justification in the economy of development programs and in the 
politics of identity (where numbers are strategic for advocacy), it is often felt as an embarrassing and intrusive 
procedure from a personal perspective (see Knight 2015 on the issue). Here again we find an opposition between the 
logic of development/rights and personal perspectives.
45 Recently Saurav Jung Thapa (August 2015),  in the blog for the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), 
reported that “11 transgender people chose this designation on their citizenship documents to date,  which is a 
prerequisite before seeking a passport with the same designation.”
patterns of patriarchy and social and gender hierarchies, which, it can be argued, lie at the very 
root of the discrimination against LGBTI people.46
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